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WEAVING THE CLOTH OF SUPPLEMENTAL




"But he doesn't have anything on," exclaimed the child upon ob-
serving the emperor.' In Hans Christian Andersen's classic tale, The
Emperor's New Clothes,2 two swindlers came to the court of an emperor
and claimed the ability to weave the most exquisite cloth. This cloth
had a rather unique property though-it was "invisible to any person
who was unfit for his position or inexcusably stupid."3 The emperor
charged the swindlers to fashion new clothes from this cloth for his
upcoming procession. Anxious to hear of the tailors' progress, the
emperor sent members of his court to inspect the tailors' work. Al-
though they could see no cloth, the members of the imperial court
nevertheless exclaimed its delicate and charming character, for they
feared the emperor would deride them as incompetent if they admit-
ted the truth. On the day of the royal procession, the emperor excit-
edly awaited his new clothes, but, when they arrived, he too could not
see them. Nevertheless, the emperor donned his new clothes because
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2007; B.S. Truman State
University, 2004. First and foremost, I would like to thank my family, particularly my
parents, Dennis and Patty, and my friends for their enduring love and support. I
would like to thank Professor Jay Tidmarsh for his ever-helpful advice and counsel.
Katherine D. Spitz, G. David Mathues, and Professor Anthony J. Bellia also provided
invaluable assistance on prior drafts of this Note. Finally, I would like to thank those
many educators and staff members at Sumner Academy of Arts and Science and
Truman State University who truly inspired me to achieve all that I can.
1 HANs CHRISTAN ANDERSeN, The Emperor's New Clothes, in FmaRY TALFs 91, 94
(Jackie Wullschlager ed., Tiina Nunnally trans., 2005).
2 Id. at 91-95.
3 Id. at 91.
[VOL. 82:2
R DA4E LAW REVIEW
844 1' . ...... ...
he feared his court would ridicule him if 
he admitted he could not see
the garments. After the cry of the young child 
during the procession,
the entire crowd echoed, "But he doesn't 
have anything on!"
4 The
emperor cringed but continued.
5
Andersen's tale reminds us to look closely, 
for there may be a
distinction between rhetoric and reality. 
This admonition can serve
legal scholars as well. The answer to a 
most fundamental question of
law-the relative power of the legislative 
and judicial branches to con-
trol the subject-matter jurisdiction of 
lower federal courts-continues
to elude legal scholars. The debates 
during the Constitutional Con-
vention provide little guidance because 
"matters other than the na-
tional judiciary consumed the bulk of 
the delegates' attention."
6 The
compromise reached by the delegates, 
codified as Article III of the
Constitution,
7 furthermore, establishes but a mere framework 
for the
federal judiciary. In search for an answer, 
then, scholars have turned
to the Supreme Court. However, the 
Court has done little to resolve
this debate. Like the tailors in Andersen's 
tale, the Supreme Court
has presented the sovereign with a beautifully 
tailored jurisprudence
of congressional supremacy that bares 
little relation to reality.
Professor Barry Friedman developed 
an analytical framework to
see through the Court's rhetoric and 
resolve this fundamental ques-
tion of power.
8 He constructed two models-congressional 
power
and dialogic-to analyze the interactions 
between Congress and the
4 Id. at 94-95.
5 Id. at 95.
6 PatrickJ. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity 
Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism,
and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 
72 TEX. L. REv. 79, 90 (1993).
In part, delegates were able to focus on 
other matters because they were "'unani-
mous ... in the Expedy & Necessy of 
a supreme judiciary Tribunal of universal 
Juris-
diction-in Controversies of a legal 
Nature between StatesRevefue& 
appellate
[sic] Causes between subjects of foreign 
or different States,'" according to Mr. 
Bald-
win, a delegate from Georgia. HenryJ. 
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdic-
tion, 41 IJARV. L. Rrv. 483, 486-87 (1928) 
(quoting 3 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS 
OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, 168, 169-70 (1911)) (alteration 
in original).
7 Per the first Section of that Article, the "judicial 
Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, 
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish." 
U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 1. Detailing the
jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, the 
second Section of Article III reads, in perti-
nent part, "[t]hejudicial Power shall extend 
to all Cases ... arising under this Consti-
tution, the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made. .. under their Authority 
...
to Controversies . . . between Citizens 
of different States." Id. § 2, cl. 1.
8 See Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: 
The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal
juisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1990) [hereinafter 
Friedman, Different Dialogue];
Barry Friedman, Federal Jurisdiction and 
Legal Scholarship: A (Dialogic) Reply, 85 Nw. 
U.
L. REV. 478 (1991) [hereinafter Friedman, 
(Dialogic) Reply].
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federal judiciary on questions of Article III, generally, and subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction of lower federal courts, more particularly.9 At its most
fundamental level, the congressional power model contends that the
Constitution grants Congress the ultimate authority to determine the
subject-matter jurisdiction of lower federal courts.' 0 In contrast, pro-
ponents of the dialogic model predict that a discourse between the co-
equal judicial and legislative branches determines the actual contours
of lower federal court subject-matterjurisdiction. I 1 Part I of this Note
summarizes Professor Friedman's analytic framework.
The efficacy of these two models may be tested by examining ac-
tual interactions between Congress and the federal judiciary. Supple-
mental jurisdiction' 2 is a particularly fruitful area for investigation.
This area of jurisprudence has evolved for over forty years and has
been particularly active in recent decades. Part II examines the inter-
actions between the judiciary and Congress regarding the proper
scope of supplemental jurisdiction.
After Congress enacted a supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1367, disputes quickly arose between the circuit courts as to
its effect on the scope of supplemental jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court sought to resolve this question in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Services, Inc.'3 The Court's approach to dealing with Congress's inter-
jection into this area provides a window into the Court's view of its
power to affect subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, Part III ana-
lyzes the Supreme Court's reasoning in Allapattah.
The Court's supplemental jurisdiction jurisprudence provides
several examples of a divergence between rhetoric and action. By fo-
cusing on the Court's reasoning as opposed to its rhetoric, evidence
for the Court's true conception of its own power can be found. In the
end, the interactions of the Court and Congress provide evidence in
support of the dialogic model.
9 Professor Friedman fails to consider a "judicial power model" in his analysis.
Supporters of this model would, presumably, argue that the judiciary has the superior
position when determining lower federal court subject-matter jurisdiction.
10 See infra Part I.A.
11 See infra Part I.C.
12 The author of this Note uses the term "supplemental jurisdiction" merely as
shorthand for pendent and ancillary jurisdictions. But see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Al-
lapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2621 (2005) ("Nothing in § 1367 indicates a
congressional intent to recognize, preserve, or create some meaningful, substantive
distinction between the jurisdictional categories we have historically labeled pendent
and ancillary.").
13 125 S. Ct. 2611. Because Allapattah is a diversity class action, this Note will not
discuss § 1367's interaction with other forms ofjurisdiction, such as federal question
jurisdiction.
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Part IV, then, summarizes the insights into the Court's jurispru-
dence and the dialogic model that the analysis in this Note brings to
the fore.
I. THE MODELS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Legal scholars generally accept the premise that Article III grants
Congress power over the jurisdiction of lower federal courts.1 4 The
debate, therefore, focuses on the relative power of Congress and the
federal judiciary to determine the final scope of subject-matter juris-
diction. Professor Friedman offers two models to explain the process
of determining jurisdiction-congressional power and dialogic. This
Part summarizes Professor Friedman's analytical approach.
15
A. Congressional Power Model
The congressional power model is an aggregation of several inter-
pretations of Article III. At base, the premise that Congress has the
power to set the final scope of federal jurisdiction within constitu-
tional bounds joins these interpretations. 16 In other words, Congress
has the power to circumscribe the scope of the judicial power. Ac-
cordingly, federal courts may only exercise jurisdiction if there is both
a constitutional grant and a congressional authorization. "Constitu-
tional power is merely the first hurdle that must be overcome in deter-
mining that a federal court has jurisdiction over a particular
controversy. For the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited not
14 See David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the Judicial
Branch, 1999 BYU L. REv. 75, 76-79 (noting that some scholars "have argued that a
'plenary' power in Congress to meddle with the courts is an aspect of constitutional
'checks and balances,' and there are some Supreme Court dicta exhibiting what one
observer described as 'an almost unseemly enthusiasm in discussing Congress' power
to lop off diverse heads of ... [A]rticle III jurisdiction'" (footnotes omitted)). Given
that Professor Friedman suggests that both Congress and the federal judiciary create
the contours of lower court jurisdiction, the dialogic model would also endorse this
statement.
15 As Professor Friedman notes, this discussion joins two different, but related,
questions. See Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at 5-10. The first question
concerns the authority of Congress to allocate jurisdiction to federal courts and the
limits on that authority. Id. The second question centers on the permissibility of
courts to decline to exercise that jurisdiction authorized by Congress. Id.
16 Proponents of the congressional power model acknowledge that extra-Article
III provisions such as the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment also limit Con-
gress's power. See RicR-A.RD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 335 (5th ed.
2003) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLERI]; Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at
[VOL, 82:2
2006l WEAVING THE CLOTH OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 847
only by the provisions of Art. III of the Constitution, but also by Acts
of Congress.' 7
The limited divergence among the different permutations of the
congressional power model centers on the constraints that Article III
itself places on the power of Congress to affect the scope of subject-
matter jurisdiction. One permutation-the "strong" congressional
power model-contends Article III places no constraints on Con-
gress's power.' 8 This reading of Article III suggests that the power to
create lower federal courts granted to Congress in the Tribunals
Clause 19 necessarily grants Congress the plenary power to control in-
ferior courts, including "prescribing and circumscribing subject mat-
ter jurisdiction [and] dictating details of procedure, evidence, and
remedies."20 Supporters of this proposition look to the 1850 Supreme
Court decision in Sheldon v. Sill.2l There, the Court stated, "Congress
may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the
enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can have no ju-
risdiction but such as the statute confers." 22
Another permutation of this model-"mandatory" congressional
power-is most closely associated with the arguments proffered byJus-
17 Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978).
18 See Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at 31.
19 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in ... such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.").
Professor Friedman notes that the strong variant also relies on the Exception
Clause of Article III to permit almost unlimited congressional control over the juris-
diction of the Supreme Court. See Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at 35-36.
However, a discussion of this concept is outside of the scope of this Note.
20 Engdahl, supra note 14, at 105. Proponents of the strong model argue, in part,
that the principle of federalism supports this view of the Tribunal Clause. As Profes-
sor Friedman argues, "[u]nder the strong congressional control model, a state court
is at least as good as, if not better than, a federal court with regard to protecting
constitutional rights. According to the strong model proponents, state courts are the
,primary guarantors of constitutional rights.'" Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note
8, at 37 (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953)). Accord-
ingly, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky proposes that division of jurisdiction between
state and federal courts is a policy decision properly considered by Congress. See
Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593, 600-01 (1991). See
generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary,
36 UCLA L. REv. 233, 233-35 (1988) (summarizing the history of the parity debate).
Professor Friedman takes issue with this assertion because of the continuing de-
bate over the parity between federal and state courts. See Friedman, Different Dialogue,
supra note 8, at 37 & n.196.
21 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
22 Id. at 449.
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tice Joseph Story and Professor Akhil Amar.
23 The Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Story, succinctly 
summarized this interpreta-
tion in Martin v. Hunter's 
Lessee2
4 :
[Tlhere are two classes of cases enumerated 
in the constitution, be-
tween which a distinction seems to be 
drawn. The first class [enu-
merated in Article III, Section 2] includes 
cases arising under the
constitution, laws, and treaties of the 
United States .... In this class
the expression is, and that the judicial 
power shall extend to all
cases but in the subsequent part of 
the clause which embraces all
the other cases of national cognizance, 
[including diversity jurisdic-
tion,] and forms the second class, the 
word "all" is dropped seem-
ingly ex industria. Here the judicial 
authority is to extend to
controversies (not to all controversies) 
.... 25
According to "mandatory" scholars, 
therefore, the text of Article
III limits the power of Congress to 
control the subject-matterjurisdic-
tion of lower federal courts in 
the first class of enumerated cases.
23 See Friedman, Different Dialogue, 
supra note 8, at 40-48. While this Note 
raises
two versions of the mandatory argument, 
there are others that exist. See id. at 
39-40;
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 16, 
at 342-44; infra note 24.
24 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
Justice Story believed that the Constitution
may place an even greater burden on 
Congress. "If, then, it is a duty of congress 
to
vest the judicial power of the United 
States," according to Justice Story, "it 
is a duty to
vest the whole judicial power. The language, 
if imperative as to one part, is imperative
as to all." Id. at 330. However, Congress 
has never vested full, constitutional jurisdic-
tion in federal courts. HART & WECHtSLER, 
supra note 16, at 320. Importantly, 
the
judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 
73, is seen as a window through which 
modern
scholars may view the intention of the 
founding generation. HART & WECHSLER, 
supra
note 16, at 342. The first Congress's 
failure to fully vest courts with all 
Article III
jurisdiction, therefore, militates against 
an interpretation of the Constitution 
that re-
quires full vesting of permissible jurisdiction 
in federal courts. Although such criti-
cism applies to the mandatory permutation 
presented in this Note, Professor Amar
has breathed new life into this approach. 
See id. at 343-44.
25 Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 
at 333-34. Professor Daniel Meltzer argues,
conversely, that this distinction between 
the two tiers of federal jurisdiction 
is too
dramatic to be made by such a slight 
change in phrase. HART & WECHSLER, 
supra note
16, at 344 (citing DanielJ. Meltzer, 
The History and Structure of Article IlI, 
138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1569 (1990)).
Proponents of the strong variant argue 
that the Constitutional Convention repre-
sented a compromise on the federal 
judiciary, in general, and on the existence 
of
lower federal courts, in particular. In 
the spirit of this compromise, Congress 
should
have the power to determine "whether 
and under what circumstances lower 
federal
courts should exist." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
FEDERALJtJRISDICTION § 3.3, at 195 (4th 
ed.
2003). But see Akhil Reed Amar, A 
Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating 
the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. 
REv. 205 (1985) [hereinafter Amar, 
A Neo-Federal-
ist View] (providing historical justification 
for the mandatory variant); Akhil Reed
Amar, Taking Article III Seriously: A 
Reply to Professor Friedman, 85 Nw. U. 
L. REv. 442
(1991) [hereinafter Amar, Reply to Professor 
Friedman] (same).
[VOL. 82:2
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However, Article III does not impose such a limitation on Congress's
power over the second class of controversies.2 6 Much like the "strong"
congressional power model proponents, then, "mandatory" scholars
believe Article III grants Congress final authority over the scope of
subject-matter jurisdiction for lower federal courts-at least, over the
second class of jurisdictional grants.
While "mandatory" and "strong" theorists disagree over Con-
gress's power to authorize certain of the specified cases and controver-
sies, they both acknowledge Congress's wide latitude to control the
scope of those subject matters over which it has discretion.
B. The Problem of Discretion
In conjunction with the congressional power model, Professor
Friedman considers the obligation of courts to exercise congressio-
nally authorized subject-matter jurisdiction. 27 Professor Friedman ar-
gues that the discretionary school of thought, which is most closely
associated with Professor David Shapiro, assumes congressional
supremacy over subject-matterjurisdiction. 28 Hence, he places Profes-
sor Shapiro's school within the congressional power model.
According to Professor Shapiro, federal courts exercise discretion
when they determine whether or not to hear a case.2 9 A court exer-
cises discretion when it declines to hear a case for which it has jurisdic-
tion, or, more subtly, when it interprets a jurisdictional statute not to
authorize judicial power over the subject matter of the case.30 Yet, the
26 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 343-44; Amar,
Reply to Professor Friedman, supra note 25, at 446-50.
27 See Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at 8-9.
28 See id. Professor Friedman summarizes the various perspectives in this debate
as two schools-obligation and discretion. The first school "maintains that federal
courts have a 'virtually unflagging obligation' to exercise the jurisdiction granted
them by Congress." Id. at 8 & n.31. Champions of this school include Chief Justice
John Marshall and Professors Martin Redish and Philip Kurland. Id. at 8. In fact,
Chief Justice Marshall thought it would be treasonous for a court to decline to exer-
cise congressionally authorized subject-matterjurisdiction. See David L. Shapiro, Juris-
diction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 543 (1985). The second school accords
.much greater discretion to the federal courts to decide in which cases jurisdiction
will be exercised." Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at 8.
29 See Shapiro, supra note 28, at 543-45. Professor Shapiro notes that there are
two forms of discretion-normative and allocative. "Normative discretion is discre-
tion delegated to a rulemaking or adjudicative body by the legislature, while allocative
discretion refers to delegation of decision-making authority within a particular hierar-
chy (here, the judiciary)." Id. at 546. Professor Shapiro focuses on normative
discretion.
30 See id. at 561-62. Neither the Constitution nor jurisdictional statutes necessa-
rily provide the authority for the court to exercise this discretion. Instead, "as experi-
[VOL. 82:2
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federal judiciary does not have unbridled 
power to exercise this dis-
cretion. Initially, "when jurisdiction is conferred 
... there is at least a
'principle of preference' that a court should entertain and resolve on
its merits an action within the 
scope of the jurisdictional grant."
3'
When declining to exercise jurisdiction, 
according to Professor Sha-
piro, the court should look to countervailing 
concerns such as federal-
ism, separation of powers, and judicial administration.
32 However,
"the language of the [jurisdictional] grant, 
the historical context in
which the grant was made, or the common 
law tradition behind it"
can expand or reduce a court's discretion, 
even to the point of elimi-
nation.33 Professor Shapiro, therefore, 
appears to support the legisla-
tive supremacy envisioned by the 
congressional power model.
34
Professor Friedman too quickly disregards 
Professor Shapiro's
discretionary school as another brick in 
the edifice of the congres-
sional power model.
35 As shown in Parts III and IV, the line between
discretion and dialogue can, at times, be 
difficult to discern.
C. The Dialogic Model
As an alternative to the congressional 
power model, Professor
Friedman constructed the dialogic model. 
3 6 At its most fundamental
level, the dialogic model asserts that 
"[A]rticle III means what it
comes to mean as the Court and Congress 
interact. T37 Likewise, the
ence and tradition teach, the question whether 
a court must exercise jurisdiction and
resolve a controversy on its merits is difficult, 
if not impossible, to answer in gross.
And the courts are functionally better adapted 
to engage in the necessary fine tuning
than is the legislature." Id. at 574. This 
argument is similar to the inherent powers
argument this Note offers for the dialogic 
model. See infra note 45.
31 Shapiro, supra note 28, at 575 (footnotes 
omitted).
32 See id. at 579-88. Some of these factors 
are strikingly similar to those offered
by Professor Friedman. See infra note 47.
33 Shapiro, supra note 28, at 575.
34 See id. at 575-76.
35 Professor Friedman even acknowledges 
that "this obviously is a tricky question
within the context of the congressional 
control approach." Friedman, Different 
Dia-
logue, supra note 8, at 8.
36 Friedman, (Dialogic) Reply, supra note 
8, at 478 ("At bottom, what [Professor
Friedman] hoped to accomplish was to 
challenge the nature of the debate that 
has
occurred on this subject [of relative power] 
virtually since the time of the Constitu-
tion's framing. [His] original article grew 
out of frustration at two levels: first, the
positions frequently taken in the debate 
were observably incorrect, that is, they were
not an accurate description of the 'data' 
bearing on the question; and second, framed
as it was, the debate was not going anywhere 
but to and fro, while interesting ques-
tions remained unanswered.").
37 Id. at 489. "The dialogic approach 
is the most reasonable interpretation 
of
[A] rticle III precisely because it does the 
best job of harmonizing the text of the
..... A u I AW REVIEW
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interaction between Congress and the federal 
judiciary determines
the scope of lower federal courts' subject-matter 
jurisdiction. '8 The
Constitution, according to Professor Friedman, 
leaves unresolved
"how far Congress may go in controlling 
federal jurisdiction and, con-
versely, to what extent the federal courts 
may resist such control, or
assert themselves in defining the 
scope of federal jurisdiction."
3 9
As with congressional power, the dialogic 
model first looks to the
text of Article III for guidance. Professor 
Friedman cites the compet-
ing permutations of the congressional power 
model as evidence that
there is no "correct" interpretation of Article 
I1.40 For example, Con-
gress may assert the strong congressional 
permutation as justification
for exercising greater power over the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of
lower federal courts just as the federal 
judiciary may look to the
mandatory variant for support to limit Congress's 
authority.4' The de-
bate between the competing permutations 
within the congressional
power model, moreover, evidences a 
dialogue within the legal com-
munity over the relative powers of Congress 
and the courts to control
subject-matter jurisdiction.
As described by the dialogic model, Congress 
and the federal ju-
diciary interact via their respective, institutional 
competencies.
42 Con-
gress, of course, may enact jurisdictional 
statutes such as §§ 1332 and
Constitution, the judicial interpretation 
of that text, and policy arguments concern-
ing which branch should maintain control 
over federal jurisdiction." Friedman, 
Dif-
ferent Dialogue, supra note 8, at 29.
38 See Friedman, (Dialogic) Reply, supra 
note 8, at 478.
39 Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra 
note 8, at 48. In the context of the execu-
tive and legislative powers, the Court has 
accepted the notion that the boundary 
is not
always clearly defined and is subject to 
the vagaries of circumstance. See, e.g., 
Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concur-
ring). That the full scope and source of 
the judiciary's power vis-a-vis Congress may
be similarly uncertain should not be entirely 
surprising. But see Shapiro, supra note
28, at 578-79 ("Of equal importance, it 
means that these criteria are capable of 
being
articulated and openly applied by the 
courts, evaluated by critics of the courts' 
work,
and reviewed by the legislative branch. 
The elemental requirement of candor, 
which
is basic to the proper carrying out of 
the judicial function, calls for no less.").
40 See Friedman, Different Dialogue, 
supra note 8, at 50-51. Professor Friedman
chastises the proponents of the strong 
and mandatory congressional power 
models
for their inability to definitively prove 
their variant superior to the other. See 
Fried-
man, (Dialogic) Reply, supra note 8, at 480.
41 See Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra 
note 8, at 50-51. As previously noted,
however, the mandatory permutation 
would provide a weak justification for 
limiting
congressional power over the second 
class of cases and controversies identified 
by
Justice Story and Professor Amar, which 
includes diversity jurisdiction.
42 See id. at 53.
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1367; the judiciary asserts itself through the adjudication of cases. 43
Professor Friedman illustrates a possible interaction between the two
branches:
[1]f Congress tries to so curtail the Supreme Court's jurisdiction,
and if the Court acquiesces, then the [Court's jurisdiction is cur-
tailed] -at least (and only) for the time being .... But, if the Court
resists, either by holding the limitation unconstitutional, or (as is
more likely) by construing its way around the statute . . . the
[Court's jurisdiction would not be curtailed]i-at least so long as
Congress goes along with the Court's construction.
44
Importantly, the logic underlying Professor Friedman's model ne-
cessitates acceptance of the possibility that the order of this example
could be reversed. Per the dialogic model, the federal judiciary has a
fount of independent power by which it may act.45 Because the Court
43 The federal judiciary impacts the scope of lower-court, subject-matter jurisdic-
tion with both its procedural and substantive decisions. See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FED-
ERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 17-22 (1973) (discussing the impact of judicial
interpretations of substantive rights on the scope of jurisdiction); Friedman, Different
Dialogue, supra note 8, at 52-53 (discussing the courts' role in defining substantive
rights). The "pure 'judicial power' consists of applying pre-existing law to the facts in
a particular case, then rendering a final, binding judgment." Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IoWA L. REV. 735,
844 (2001). If the duty of the federal courts, then, is "to decide a properly presented
case in accordance with the law," Shapiro, supra note 28, at 579, they must make a
critical determination-whether or not they have jurisdiction to hear the case.
44 Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at 48-49. Because this Note focuses
on the subject-matter jurisdiction of lower federal courts, this example is simply illus-
trative of the dialogic process.
Professor Amar criticizes the underlying foundation of the dialogic model when
it is applied to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. "Friedman's 'dialogue' rests on a
reading of the text that requires a Supreme Court with some undiminishable jurisdic-
tion. (Friedman's 'flexible' dialogue thus reads the text [of the Constitution] as
'fixed' and 'immutable,' at least to this extent.)" Amar, Reply to Professor Friedman,
supra note 25, at 446. After all, without such an assumption, "Congress could silence
the Court by stripping it of all jurisdiction ... or better still, by eliminating the Court
altogether." Id. As noted by Professor Friedman, however, such a "dooms-day" scena-
rio has yet to occur in the history of the United States. See infra note 49.
45 While not raised by Professor Friedman, courts could reference inherent
power. Though the federal courts have never reconciled their claim of inherent
power with the Constitution, they have continually asserted power to control their
dockets. Pushaw, supra note 43, at 760-61, 783-86 (2001). Judge Friendly urged:
If even [modest reform of diversity jurisdiction] . . . cannot be enacted with
more than deliberate speed, I see no reason why busy district courts should
not promulgate rules that . . . all other proceedings shall be preferred for
trial over actions where federal jurisdiction is invoked solely on the basis that
the parties are citizens of different states ....
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can disregard Congress's will as expressed via 
the legislative process,
the enactment of a statute is but a mere 
formality; federal courts need
not act as servants to the congressional 
will. Any resulting congres-
sional silence after the Court acts may, 
therefore, be read as tacit ap-
proval, for the time being 
at least, of the judiciary's conduct.
4 6
Free from the deferential role envisioned 
by the congressional
power model, courts may interject their 
own substantive policy deter-
minations into debates over the scope 
of subject-matter jurisdiction.
In other words, courts have the power 
of choice.47 They may choose
to cooperate with the legislative branch 
and further that branch's pol-
icy goals, or the interaction between 
the two branches can devolve
into "an elaborate game of 'push-shove,' 
in which the branches resist
one another's views of when the exercise 
of federal jurisdiction is
appropriate.
''48
Because the branches are coequal, no 
entity exists to arbitrate
disputes between the two. The political 
environment in conjunction
with the relative strength of each branch's 
arguments determines the
FRIENDLY, supra note 43, 152. The use of 
docket control mechanisms to marginalize
certain, undesirable types of jurisdiction 
in spite of congressional intent would 
be
consistent with the dialogic approach.
46 See Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra 
note 8, at 48-49. See infra note 71 and
accompanying text for another example.
47 See Friedman, Dfferent Dialogue, supra note 
8, at 52-55. In his original work,
Professor Friedman identifies several factors 
courts may examine when determining
questions of jurisdiction, including: protection 
of federal rights and interests, comity
and federalism, caseloads and judicial resources, 
and need for uniformity. Id. at 52.
In support of this position, Professor Friedman 
asserts "the Supreme Court ought
to-and does-possess at least as much 
authority and expertise as Congress over
[these] factors." Id.
According to critics, questions of federalism 
and the conduct of the federal gov-
ernment should be decided by the citizenry 
via their elected representatives as op-
posed to unelected judges. Congressional 
supremacy protects state governments
against "the danger that the federal courts 
will aggrandize their power at the expense
of the states." Michael Wells, Congress's 
Paramount Role in Setting the Scope of 
Federal
Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 465, 467 (1991). 
As discussed below, see infra Part Ill.B,
many members of the founding generation 
feared that the federal courts would de-
stroy or, at least, severely undercut the role 
of state courts. Congressional enactments
reflect the will of the citizenry, which should 
constrain the federal judiciary unless this
constraint would violate another provision 
of the Constitution.
48 Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 
8, at 49.
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outcome of the dispute. 49 In the end, Congress and the judiciary will
reach an equilibrium point on the particular question at issue.
50
To support this predicted interaction, Professor Friedman relies
heavily on data describing the actual interaction between the two
branches and normative rationales.5 1 Professor Friedman asserts that
the dialogic model provides an "accurate description of the 'data'
bearing on the question" of the relative power of the judiciary and
Congress.52 While Professor Friedman cites several examples to sup-
port his hypothesis,5 3 as will be shown in Parts II and III, the history of
supplemental jurisdiction lends strong support to the dialogic model.
Professor Friedman additionally argues that the flexibility embedded
in the dialogic model promotes respect between the legislative and
judicial branches. This freedom of action promotes caution, discour-
ages overreaching, and allows for flexibility as times and circum-
49 See id. at 54-55. Professor Friedman notes that "for two hundred years, these
ultimate crises have, by and large, been avoided." Id. at 55. In the rare instances in
which the process has "broken down," such as the Roosevelt Court-packing plan, the
failure is often more the result of one branch taking the other branch's decision as
being final. See id. Professor Friedman also notes, however, that the flexibility for
each branch in this system can often help prevent these "break downs." See id. at 57.
50 Id. at 56 ("The dialogue does not suggest that the process of defining jurisdic-
tion is completely open-ended ... Congress inevitably will enact a number ofjurisdic-
tional statutes, and the Court and federal courts generally will put them into
operation. Over time certain patterns emerge, and it becomes somewhat easier to
predict what the reaction of either branch will be."). Thus, dialogue typically occurs
on the fringes of jurisdiction or when one branch takes uncharacteristically drastic
action. See id.
"If everything truly is open," critics contend, "we have interpretive nihilism and
chaos, not an 'enduring framework."' Amar, Reply to Professor Friedman, supra note 25,
at 443.
51 Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at 29 ("The dialogic approach is the
most reasonable interpretation of [A] rticle III precisely because it does the bestjob of
harmonizing the text of the Constitution, the judicial interpretation of that text, and
policy arguments concerning which branch should maintain control over federal
jurisdiction.").
52 Friedman, (Dialogic) Reply, supra note 8, at 478; see also FRIENDLY, supra note 43,
at 22 (noting that individuals increasingly look to federal courts instead of Congress
to supply legal reforms).
53 For examples cited by Professor Friedman in support of this contention, see
Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at 10-28. As an illustration, Professor Fried-
man cites the seeming inconsistent treatment of the complete diversity and amount-
in-controversy requirements in Supreme Tribe ofBen-Hurv. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921),
and Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). Congressional power propo-
nents criticize Professor Friedman's interpretation of some of the cases used to sup-
port his argument. See Amar, Reply to Professor Friedman, supra note 25, at 448-50;
Wells, supra note 47, at 468-70.
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stances change.
4 Furthermore, the federal judiciary 
is "more
competent than Congress in refining jurisdictional 
decisions," accord-
ing to Professor Friedman.
5 5 In practice, Congress simply cannot an-
swer all questions of jurisdiction 
before or even after they arise.5
6
Because of the ambiguity of Article III, then, 
Professor Friedman
looks to the actual interactions of Congress 
and the federal judiciary
and normative principles for guidance 
when interpreting that Article
of the Constitution.
5 7 Based on these observations and principles,
Professor Friedman's dialogic model predicts 
that the interactions be-
tween Congress and the federal judiciary 




Though the dialogic and congressional 
power models may be
seen as competing with each other, the 
dialogic model conceptually
incorporates the deference to congressional 
intent envisioned by the
congressional power model.
5 9 For a court may have freedom to act
and, yet, choose not to exercise that 
freedom. If a court chooses to
defer to congressional pronouncements, 
for instance, its reasoning
would likely appear similar to that used 
by congressional power propo-
nents. Examples of courts going beyond 
congressional intent, there-
fore, will be critical in determining 
the accuracy of the dialogic
model.
While no single note will resolve the debate 
between legal schol-
ars, a detailed examination of the interactions 
between Congress and
the federal judiciary can advance the debate 
by providing evidence to
support one model or the other. The history 
of supplemental jurisdic-
tion and the Court's recent assessment 
of Congress's supplemental
jurisdiction statute in Allapattah provide 
fertile ground for such an
examination.
54 See Friedman, Different Dialogue, 
supra note 8, at 57-58. "The dialogic 
ap-
proach . .. not only has room for such 
changing norms, but actually facilitates 
them.
The dialogic approach recognizes 
the Constitution has sufficient play 
in the joints to
keep the federal system operating 
smoothly." Id. at 48.
55 Id. at 60.
56 See id.
57 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying 
text.
58 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying 
text.
59 These models remind the author 
of the comparison between a square 
and
rectangle in geometry. A square is a shape 
with four sides of equal length and four
right angles. A rectangle is a shape with 
corresponding sides of equal length 
and four
right angles. Thus, a square is always 
a rectangle, but a rectangle need 
not be a
square.
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II. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION: THE PRELUDE TO ALL4PATTAH
The interaction between Congress and the federal judiciary over
the scope of the courts' supplemental jurisdiction provides strong evi-
dence in support of Professor Friedman's dialogic model. Prior to
1989, supplemental jurisdiction was largely a creature ofjudicial crea-
tion;60 Congress remained conspicuously absent from the debate.
The Supreme Court questioned this regime in its 1989 decision, Finley
v. United States.6' Subsequently, Congress interjected itself into the
area with the Judicial Improvements Act of 199062 codified, in perti-
nent part, at 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The circuit courts quickly diverged
over the impact of § 1367 on the Supreme Court's earlier jurispru-
dence. 63 This Part will briefly recount the history of supplemental ju-
risdiction and examine the evidence it provides for the dialogic
model. The Supreme Court finally resolved the dispute among the
circuits in Allapattah, which is examined in the subsequent Part of this
Note.
A. The Judicial Foundation of Supplemental jurisdiction
The modern era64 of the Court's jurisprudence began with United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs5 in 1966. This case raised a fundamental ques-
60 Section 1367 codified the previous concepts of pendent and ancillary jurisdic-
tion as "supplemental jurisdiction." H.R. RrP. No. 101-734, at 27 (1990), as reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6873.
61 490 US. 545 (1989); see also I FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND
SUBcOMMiTEE REPORTS 552 (1990).
62 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat, 5089 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.).
63 Richard D. Freer, The Cauldron Boils: Supplemental Jurisdiction, Amount in Contro-
versy, and Diversity of Citizenship Class Actions, 53 EMORY L.J. 55, 58 (2004) ("Five courts
of appeals-the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits-adopting a
largely 'textual' perspective, have concluded Zahn [v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S.
291 (1973),] is dead. Three-the Third, Eight, and Tenth Circuits-adopting two
distinct approaches, have concluded that Zahn lives." (footnotes omitted)).
64 See Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After
Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY LJ. 445, 449-50, 453 (1991)
("[T]he Supreme Court had endorsed supplemental jurisdiction for over a century
before Gibbs.").
65 383 U.S. 715 (1966). This seminal case dealt specifically with the scope of pen-
dent-claim jurisdiction. Id. at 721. "Pendent [claim] jurisdiction, in the sense ofjudi-
cial power, exists whenever there is a [federal question] claim.., and the relationship
between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action
before the court comprises but one constitutional 'case.'" Id. at 725. See generally
CHEMERNSKY, supra note 25, § 5.4, at 331-32 (summarizing scope of pendentjurisdic-
tion); FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 61, at 546 (same); Freer, supra note 64,
at 447-48 (same).
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tion of judicial power-may a federal 
court deliver judgment on a
state law claim that arises from the 
same transaction as the federal
claim then being adjudicated? Based 
on its analysis, the Supreme
Court concluded that claims could be 
resolved more efficiently and
with greater convenience to the parties 
if a federal court adjudicates
both the federal and state claims before 
it.66 If a federal court other-
wise has jurisdiction over at least 
one of the claims raised, it may, as 
a
result of Gibbs, exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over those claims
for which it lacks an independent basis 
ofjurisdiction. The Court lim-
ited this authorization to those 
claims that constitute one constitu-
tional case, which the Court defined 
as all claims deriving "from a
common nucleus of operative fact."
6 7 Moreover, the Court permitted
lower federal courts to employ discretion 
in their exercise of supple-
mental jurisdiction .
6
For over two decades after Gibbs, 
Congress did not comment on
the Court's supplemental jurisdiction 
jurisprudence, and the Court
"never addressed the need for statutory authorization 
of supplemental
"In contrast, ancillary jurisdiction can 
be understood as jurisdiction for] claims
that are asserted after thefiling of the original 
complaint that do not independently meet
the requirements for federal court jurisdiction." 
CHEMERNSKY, supra note 25, § 5.4, at
331-32. Ancillary jurisdiction typically 
involves claims between defendants and 
third-
party defendants or claims by the plaintiff 
in response to a counterclaim, interven-
tion, or the like. This type of jurisdiction 
occurs by-and-large in diversity jurisdiction
cases. See generally FED. CoURTS STUDY 
COMM., supra note 61, at 546, 550-52 
(summa-
rizing the scope of ancillary jurisdiction); 
Freer, supra note 64, at 448-49 (same);
James E. Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction 
and Section 1367: The Case for a Sympathetic
Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 134-35 
(1999) (same). The Court has not allowed
ancillary jurisdiction to expand to such 
a point as to endanger the complete diversity
rule for diversity jurisdiction. See Owen 
Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 
U.S.
365, 377 (1978). The Owen Court was 
concerned that plaintiffs would deliberately
circumvent the complete diversity rule 
by intentionally not bringing suit against 
a
non-diverse party with the intention 
that the defendant would implead 
the non-di-
verse party. Id. The plaintiff could then 
assert a claim against the now third-party
defendant. Id.
66 Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
67 Id. at 725.
In the context of ancillary jurisdiction, 
federal courts traditionally look for a 
logi-
cal relationship between the claim that 
has original jurisdiction and the additional
claim. See Owen, 437 U.S. at 376. However, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that
ancillary and pendent jurisdictions are 
"two species of the same generic problem." 
Id.
at 370. Thus, scholars have interpreted 
the pendent-claim test-common nucleus 
of
operative facts-to also apply to ancillary 
jurisdiction. See CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note
25, § 5.4, at 331.
68 Federal courts can consider judicial 
economy, substantiality of the federal
question, and convenience and fairness 
to litigants to determine if they should 
hear
the additional pendent claim. Gibbs, 
383 U.S. at 726.
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jurisdiction."69 Thus, many legal scholars concluded that supplemen-
tal jurisdiction needed no statutory base but, instead, rested upon
some sufficient common law tradition. 70  Gibbs and its progeny re-
present a repudiation of the congressional power model. Congress
cannot occupy the superior position envisioned by the congressional
power model if the Supreme Court may embark upon the seemingly
common-law analysis it employed in Gibbs. Instead, the Court's ac-
tions lend credence to the dialogic model.71
However, the Court struck a blow at the foundation of its prior
jurisprudence in Finley v. United States.72 The Court argued:
It remains rudimentary law that "[ajs regards all courts of the
United States inferior to [the Supreme Court], two things are neces-
sary to create jurisdiction .... The Constitution must have given to
the court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have
supplied it.... To the extent that such action is not taken, the power
lies dormant.73
While explicitly refusing to overturn Gibbs,74 the Court lambasted
its previous jurisprudence for "not mention[ing], let alone com[ing]
to grips with, the text of the jurisdictional statutes and the bedrock
principle that federal courts have no jurisdiction without statutory au-
thorization."7 5 To reconcile Gibbs with the "rudimentary law" of juris-
diction, the Court read the jurisdictional statutes as broadly
authorizing federal courts to dispose of an entire constitutional case at
one time.76 The Finley Court steadfastly refused to extend this reading
to other areas not covered by its previous precedents.7 7 The Court
reminded the legislative branch:
69 Freer, supra note 63, at 453.
70 Id.
71 This is an example of the silence as a form of acceptance discussed in Part I.
72 E.g., FED. COuRTS STuDY COMM., supra note 61, at 552.
73 Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 547-48 (1989) (first alteration and sec-
ond omission in original) (quoting The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252
(1868)).
74 Id. at 556 ("As we noted at the outset, our cases do not display an entirely
consistent approach with respect to the necessity that jurisdiction be explicitly con-
ferred. The Gibbs line of cases was a departure from prior practice, and a departure
that we have no intent to limit or impair.").
75 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2617 (2005) (cit-
ing Finley, 490 U.S. at 548); see also H.R. RFP. No. 101-734, supra note 60, at 6874
(summarizing Finley's holding).
76 See Finley, 490 U.S. at 549.
77 Id. Finley specifically dealt with pendent-party jurisdiction. Id. This type of
jurisdiction "permits a plaintiff to join to a federal claim a factually related state claim
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Whatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction conferred by a
particular statute can of course be changed by Congress. What is of
paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a
background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the ef-
fect of the language it adopts.
78
"If Finley is correct," some scholars argued, "the federal courts are
engaging in a systematic, unlawful grabbing of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion that goes to the very heart of our federal structure."7 3 These
scholars clearly viewed Finley as a repudiation of the logical underpin-
nings of the Court's previous jurisprudence and a strong affirmation
of the congressional power model. As examined in Part IV, this com-
mon reading of Finley is likely incorrect in the light of the Court's total
supplemental jurisdiction jurisprudence.
B. Section 1367 and Its Gaping Holes °
Congress responded to Finley's invitation by authorizing supple-
mental jurisdiction through 28 U.S.C. § 1367.81 Though Congress
purported to affect little change via its enactment,8 2 controversy
quickly erupted over the precise meaning and effect of the new stat-
ute. 13 This Note will not enter the decade-long debate over the effects
of § 1367 on supplemental jurisdiction. Rather, this history is re-
counted in order to provide background for the discussion of Allapat-
involving an additional, non-diverse party." FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 61,
at 546.
78 Finley, 490 U.S. at 556. Such a result would undermine the complete diversity
rule.
79 FED, COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 61, at 556 (emphasis added); see also
Pfander, supra note 65, at 156-57 ("With its emphasis on the necessity for written
authority, the Finley Court made what some have seen as a decisive break with the
past. On this account, Finley brought to a close the free-wheeling jurisdictional days
of Gibbs and inaugurated an era of close attention to statutory text.").
80 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., Compounding or Creating Confusion About
SupplementalJurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943, 961 n.91 (1991)
("We can only hope that the federal courts will plug that potentially gaping hole in
the complete diversity requirement . . ").
81 See H.R. RE. No. 101-734, supra note 60, at 6874.
82 Id.
83 For a review of the debate over § 1367, see Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury
Insurance Co., 166 F.3d 214, 220 n.5 (3d Cir. 1999). See generally Edward A. Hart-
nett, Would the Kroger Rule Survive the ALI's Proposed Revision of § 1367, 51 DUKE L.J.
647 (2001) (outlining the judicial response to Congress's enactment of § 1367 and
the probable effect of the ALI's proposed revision); Pfander, supra note 65 (propos-
ing a reading of § 1367 that accounts for both legislative history and textual
consideration).
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tah in Part III and to examine the interactions between Congress and
the judiciary.
1. Congress Responds to Finley
Turning first to the text of § 1367, the statute is composed of
three major subsections. Section 1367(a) represents a broad grant of
supplemental jurisdiction.84 Section 1367(b) limits that grant ofjuris-
diction when the court's original jurisdiction is founded upon the par-
ties' diversity of citizenship. Particularly, supplemental jurisdiction
shall not extend
over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule
14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [("Group
One")], or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plain-
tiffs under Rule 19 ... or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under
Rule 24 [ ("Group Two")] ... when exercising supplemental juris-
diction would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements
of section 1332. 85
The authors of § 1367 designed subsection (b) to prevent parties
from circumventing the requirements of diversity jurisdiction. 6 Sec-
tion 1367(c) grants courts discretion in their exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction. Scholars have generally interpreted this subsection as an
authorization for the same broad grant of discretion sanctioned by the
Supreme Court in Gibbs.
87
There is little evidence whether or not Congress was consciously
acting under the congressional power or dialogic model in either the
statute's text or its legislative history. Assuming, for the sake of argu-
ment, that Congress accepted Finley's critique of the Court's previous
reasoning, there is little warrant for pause. As seen in the discussion
of the dialogic model, both Congress and the judiciary can assert vari-
ous justifications for their respective actions. Critically, however, Con-
gress in fact established a dialogue with the Court over the proper
scope of supplemental jurisdiction by enacting § 1367. Congress both
lent its imprimatur to the previously sanctioned scope of supplemen-
tal jurisdiction and encouraged the exercise of even broader jurisdic-
tion than the Court was willing to accept in Finley.
84 "[T]he district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that
are so related to the claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
85 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
86 See H.R. REp. No. 101-734, supra note 60, at 6874.
87 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 926-28.
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2. Gaping Holes
Nonetheless, omissions in § 1367(b) caused confusion among the
circuit courts. One of these apparent oversights was Congress's failure
to include Rule 20 in Group One. The authors of the statute acknowl-
edged that, read literally, this failure permits circumvention of the re-
quirements for diversity jurisdiction.88 To overcome the drafting
error, the authors of the statute urged federal courts to "plug that
potentially gaping hole in the complete diversity requirement--either
by regarding it as an unacceptable circumvention of original diversity
requirements, or by reference to the intent not to abandon the com-
plete diversity rule that is clearly expressed in the legislative history of
section 1367."' 9
Another omission, this time from Group Two of § 1367(b), is
Rule 23, which governs federal class actions. Prior to § 1367, the Su-
preme Court held in Zahn v. International Paper Co.90 that a member of
a Rule 23 diversity class action must independently satisfy the amount-
in-controversy requirement in order for a federal court to hear that
class member's claim. 91 The statute's legislative history indicates that
Congress and the statute's authors did not intend to overturn Zahn.9
2
88 See Rowe et al., supra note 80, at 961 n.91 ("Literally, though, section 1367(b)
does not bar an original complete diversity filing and subsequent amendment to add
a nondiverse co-plaintiff under Rule 20, taking advantage of supplemental jurisdic-
tion over the claim of the new plaintiff against the existing defendant."). A non-
diverse party, for example, could join as a plaintiff after the original cause was filed.
89 Id.; see also H.R. RP No. 101-734, supra note 60, at 6874-75 & n.17.
As noted previously, a circuit split developed over the proper interpretation of
§ 1367. Those circuits that relied on the text of § 1367(b) would likely decline the
invitation to read Rule 20 into the statute. See Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp.,
333 F.3d 1248, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2003), affd sub nom. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapat-
tah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611; Rosmer v. Pfizer Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 114-19 (4th Cir.
2001); Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 933-40 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Brand
Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 1997); In re
Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 527-29 (5th Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided Court sub
nom. Free v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 529 U.S. 333 (2000).
The logic of those circuits that reliedjointly on the text of §§ 1367(a) and (b)
and/or legislative history would likely plug the hole. See Rosario Ortega v. Star-Kist
Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 124, 133-39 (1st Cir. 2004), rev'd sub nom. Allapattah, 125 S. Ct.
2611; Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 961-62 (8th Cir. 2000); Meritcare Inc. v.
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 218-22 (3d Cir. 1999); Leonhardt v. W. Sugar
Co., 160 F.3d 631, 637-41 (10th Cir. 1998).
90 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
91 Id. at 301. For complete diversity, conversely, a court need only look at the
citizenship of the named plaintiffs as opposed to each individual plaintiff. See Su-
preme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921).
92 H.R. REP. No. 101-734, supra note 60, at 6875 & n. 17.
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However, scholars and the authors of the statute acknowledged that
the text, read literally, abrogates the Court's holding in that case.
93
Whether, in fact, § 1367 overrules Zahn has also generated much disa-
greement among the circuit courts.
94
3. Dueling Interpretations of § 1367
In the decade following the enactment of § 1367, the circuit
courts adopted two methods of interpreting the statute. Some courts
relied on the text of the statute, and others relied on its legislative
history.
a. The Textualist Approach
Those circuits utilizing textualism relied on the express language
of § 1367 to conclude that Congress intended to reject Zahn's inter-
pretation of the amount-in-controversy requirement. The Fifth Cir-
cuit adopted this method of analysis in In re Abbott Laboratories.95
There, the court examined the amount-in-controversy requirement in
the context of Rule 23 diversity class actions. 96 The Fifth Circuit
grudgingly acknowledged that legislative history signaled no intent on
the part of Congress to overturn Zahn.97 Nevertheless, the court re-
fused to consider this history because it believed the statute to be un-
ambiguous.98 The court found, consequently, that the statute
overturns Zahn.99
The Seventh Circuit extended the logic of Abbott Laboratories to
Rule 20joinder in Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc.00
However, the court went further and acknowledged what the authors
of the section feared, that § 1367 "has the potential to move from
complete to minimal diversity." 01
93 See Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d at 527 n.5; Freer, supra note 64, at 485; Rowe et al.,
supra note 80, at 961 n.91.
94 See infra Part II.B.3.
95 51 F.3d 524.
96 Id. at 526.
97 Id. at 528.
98 Id. at 528-29 ("IT]he statute is the sole repository of congressional intent
where the statute is clear and does not demand an absurd result.").
99 Id. at 529.
100 77 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1996). Although Zahn applied to class actions, the
Third and Seventh Circuits have held that Zahn applies equally to Rule 20 joinder.
Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 337 (1969)); Stromberg Metal Works, Inc., 77 F.3d at 931.
101 Stromberg Metal Works, Inc., 77 F.3d at 932. If diversity exists between at least
one plaintiff and the defendants, non-diverse plaintiffs could then join under Rule 20,
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b. The Legislative History Approach
Conversely, a minority of circuit courts 
chose to examine the stat-
ute's legislative history and, subsequently, 
concluded that § 1367 does
not repudiate Zahn's interpretation 
of the amount-in-controversy re-
quirement.10
2 The Third Circuit's decision in Meritcare 
Inc. v. St. Paul
Mercury Insurance Co.'
03 exemplifies this approach. As with Stromberg,
the Third Circuit examined the amount-in-controversy 
rule in the
context of Rule 20 joinder.
10 4 The Meritcare court found, however,
"there is sufficient ambiguity in [§ 1367] 
to make resort to the legisla-
tive history appropriate."
10 5 Based on this history, the court held 
that
Congress did not intend to 
abrogate Zahn.
10 6
The Tenth Circuit in Leonhardt v. Western 
Sugar Co. 10 7 embarked
on a slightly different path-known 
as "sympathetic textualism"'
0 -
when it analyzed § 1367, but the statute's 
legislative history guides this
method as well
.10 9 This approach focuses on the different 
functions
of §§ 1367(a) and (b).
110 The Tenth Circuit read
section 1367(a) as having incorporated 
the joinder and aggregation
rules of complete diversity into its requirements 
that the district
court first obtain "original jurisdiction" 
of the claims in a civil ac-
tion .... [Tihe restrictions in section 
1367(b) operate to prevent
the erosion of the complete diversity requirement 
that might other-
and the court could exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over these new claims 
based
on the court's interpretation.
102 See Meritcare, 166 F.3d at 222; Leonhardt 
v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631, 640-41
(10th Cir. 1998).
103 166 F.3d 214.
104 Id. at 216.
105 Id. at 222.
106 Id. With such reliance on legislative 
history, Meritcare effectively reads Rule 
20
into the second grouping of § 1367.
107 160 F.3d 631.
108 See Pfander, supra note 65. For arguments 
opposing sympathetic textualism,
see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 
Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2621-22 
(2005);
Freer, supra note 63, at 79-85.
109 See Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 640-41; 
Pfander, supra note 65, at 147-48. 
Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg asserts that her 
interpretation of § 1367, which mirrors 
sympa-
thetic textualism, "does not rely on the 
measure's legislative history." Ailapattah, 
125
S. Ct. at 2641 n.14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
However, she cites the section's legisla-
tive history in her dissenting opinion, 
id. at 2640 n.13, and notes that her interpreta-
tion of § 1367 is in accord with the 
legislative history. Id. at 2641 n.1
4 (citing id. at
2628-31 (StevensJ., dissenting)).
110 See Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 639-40; 
Pfander, supra note 65, at 114.
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wise result from an expansive application . . . of ancillary
jurisdiction.' I I
Because each plaintiff must satisfy the amount-in-controversy and
complete diversity requirements in order for a court to have original
diversity jurisdiction,' 12 the omission of Rules 20 and 23 from
§ 1367(b) do not work as an abrogation of Zahn or the complete di-
versity requirement. 13
Consequently, two different approaches emerged over the proper
method to interpret § 1367. One focuses solely on the text of the stat-
ute, and the other uses legislative history to inform its opinion. The
division among the circuits once again called the Supreme Court into
the area of supplemental jurisdiction.
1 14
III. ALLAPATTA-: CAUTION, DIALOGUE AT WORK
Allapattah officially presents "the question [of] whether a federal
court in a diversity action may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
additional plaintiffs whose claims do not satisfy the minimum amount-
in-controversy requirement, provided" some members of the class do
satisfy that requirement.' 1 5 Like Stromberg, the Court does not limit its
answer to the amount-in-controversy question presented; it looks
more fundamentally at the interaction between § 1367 and § 1332.' 16
The Court's analysis provides a window through which one may view
the Court's conception of its own power to determine the scope of
subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court first divorces its examination
from the statute's legislative history.1 1 7 Then, in an un-Finley-like anal-
ysis, the Court responds, through the guise of statutory interpretation,
with its own judgment on the proper scope of supplemental jurisdic-
111 Pfander, supra note 65, at 114; see also Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 639-40 (adopting
and explaining the sympathetic textualist interpretation of § 1367).
112 See Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 311-12 (1973) (requiring each party
to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 267 (1806) (requiring complete diversity). There is an exception to the gen-
eral rule of complete diversity-in class actions, it is only applied against the named
plaintiffs. See Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
113 See Leonhardt, 160 F.3d at 641; Pfander, supra note 65, at 148-49.
114 The Supreme Court previously attempted to resolve the split in Free v. Abbott
Laboratories, Inc., 529 U.S. 333 (2000) (per curiam).
115 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2615 (2005).
Thus, the key question here is the interaction between supplemental jurisdiction as
codified in § 1367 and the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. Also, as discussed
in the previous part of this Note, the answer to this question will impact Rule 20
joinder.
116 See infra Part III.B.
117 See infra Part III.A.
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tion and the effect of supplemental jurisdiction 
on the requirements
for diversity jurisdiction.
'1 8 As a result, the Court's reasoning in Al-
lapattah provides support for Professor 
Friedman's dialogic model.
A. The Role of Legislative History
A key distinction between the congressional 
power and dialogic
models is the judiciary's deference to 
congressional intent when con-
fronted with questions of jurisdiction. 
The congressional power
model demands that the Court defer 
to congressional intent when
interpreting § 1367. Conversely, no 
such deference need be given by
the Court under the dialogic model.
' 19 The Allapattah Court's reason-
ing lacks the deference predicted by 
the congressional power model.
The Supreme Court's interpretation, 
much like the textualist in-
terpretation employed by several of 
the circuit courts, rejects the use
of legislative history and, instead, relies 
solely on the text of the statute
to determine Congress's intent.
120 According to the Court, legislative
history is often ambiguous or inaccurate.
121 In Allapattah, for exam-
ple, the Court argues that the statute's 
legislative history does not
clearly indicate a congressional 
intent to retain the holding of
Zahn.122 To support its argument, 
the Court looks to the seeming
ambiguity in the Report of the Federal 
Courts Study Committee
("Study Committee"), which demarcated 
the parameters for what
would become § 1367.123 Even though 
the full committee did not en-
dorse a recommendation by its sub-committee 
to overturn Zahn, the
full committee did not explicitly 
reject this recommendation either1
2 4
The Court finds itself in a dilemma, 
unable to reconcile the final
Study Committee report with the 
sub-committee's recommenda-
118 See infra Part 1II.B.
119 As indicated in Part 1, this does 
not mean that the Court need totally 
ignore
the congressional enactment in order 
to be consistent with the dialogic model.
120 The Court notes that it must 
"examine the statute's text in light 
of [its] con-
text, structure, and related statutory 
provisions." Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 
2620. These
sources of insight, however, are unable 
to fully account for all of the provisions 
of
§ 1367 as shall be seen later in this 
Part.
121 Id. at 2626. The Court explicitly 
declines to hold that legislative materials 
are
inherently unreliable as a source of 
congressional intent. Id.
122 Id. at 2626-27.
123 Id. at 2626. The Study Committee 
was established by Congress "'to develop 
a
long-range plan for the future of the Federal 
judiciary."' FED. COURTS STUDY COMM.,
supra note 61, at 1 (quoting Federal 
Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 
100 Stat.
4644, 4644 (1988)).
124 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2626-27.
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tion. 125 Interestingly, though, the title page of the Study Committee's
Working Papers and Subcommittee Reports has the following disclaimer:
"In no event should the enclosed materials be construed as having
been adopted by the [full] Committee."1 26
Additionally, the Court criticizes legislative history for being too
malleable. In furtherance of this argument, the Court cites the draft-
ers of § 1367. The authors of the statute freely acknowledged that
"'the legislative history was an attempt to correct the oversight"' in the
statute's text, which appears to signal Congress's displeasure with
Zahn.127 However, a qualitative difference exists between the authors
of a statute clarifying the language of their statute, on the one hand,
and lobbyists or rogue members of Congress surreptitiously inserting
comments in the legislative history to fundamentally alter its meaning
on the other.
Justice John Paul Stevens also makes a potent rejoinder to the
Court's second attack on the use of legislative history. The Court is
more constrained, according to Justice Stevens, when it restricts itself
to "all reliable evidence of legislative intent."12 8 Justice Stevens plays
on the ubiquitous, friend-in-the-room analogy to exemplify his point.
One may focus on select-segments of a statute's legislative history to
support his or her preferred interpretation of the statute just as one
may pick a select group of friends in a crowded room. In the end,
however, one is confined to that room. If the Court liberates itself
from reliable legislative history, it may ground its interpretation on
any external source it chooses, including its own policy preferences.
Finally, the Court argues, "[e]xtrinsic materials have a role in stat-
utory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on
the enacting Legislature's understanding of otherwise ambiguous
terms."'129 The Court holds that "§ 1367 is not ambiguous."'13 0 There-
125 Id. at 2626-27. The Court has previously recognized that silence can be tanta-
mount to approval in certain situations. See id. at 2619 (citing Aldinger v. Howard,
427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976)). The impasse in which the Court finds itself in Allapattah
appears to be more man-made than genuine. Circuit courts adopting both the textu-
alist and deferential approaches have acknowledged that the legislative history indi-
cates Congress's desire to retain Zahn. See supra Parts II.B.3.a-b. But see Freer, supra
note 63, at 72-79. The legislative history clearly indicates that § 1367 "is not intended
to affect the jurisdictional requirements of [§ 1332 diversity jurisdiction] in diversity-
only class actions, as those requirements were interpreted prior to Finley." H.R. RP.
No. 101-734, supra note 60, at 6875.
126 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 61, at title page.
127 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2627 (quoting Rowe et. al., supra note 80, at 960 n.90).
128 Id. at 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 2626 (majority opinion).
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fore, even if congressional intent could be clarified by the statute's
history, its language would control.
In freeing itself from the section's legislative history, the Court
claims to restrict its search for congressional intent to the text of the
statute. 3 1 "As we have repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is
the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic ma-
terial" 13 2 However, the Court's interpretation of § 1367 produces its
own quandary. It acknowledges that "the omission of Rule 20 plain-
tiffs from § 1367(b) presents something of a puzzle on [its] view of
the statute."
1 33
As an anticipatory response to criticism of its opinion on this
point, the Court asserts that other interpretations of § 1367 have simi-
lar difficulties.' 3 4 Notably, such a statement is in tension with the
Court's earlier pronouncement that § 1367 is not ambiguous. The di-
alogic model foresees a court's claim that it is merely interpreting a
vague statute when, in fact, the court is crafting its own judgment on
the proper scope of jurisdiction.
If language is as malleable as many scholars today take pleasure in
demonstrating... we then have a model of congressional primacy,
but by the same token, Congress seems to have all the authority of
the Crown of Great Britain. Under this interpretation Congress
gets the "last" word, but this is (of course) subject to the vagaries of
judicial interpretation of congressional will.""5
By limiting itself solely to a vague'3 6 text, therefore, the Court
frees itself to approach this jurisdictional question, not as a willing
implementer, but as a partner with Congress. The Court, thereby,
takes a first, important step toward the dialogic method of analysis-it
130 Id. at 2625. This is consistent with the textualist approach discussed in Part
II.B.3.a. Recall, however, the Third Circuit in Meritcare opined that "[elven were we
to conclude that Section 1367 is unambiguous ... we would nevertheless turn to the
legislative history because this is one of those 'rare cases [in which] the literal applica-
tion of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
drafters.'" Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins., Co., 166 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir.
1999) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v, Sherman, 150 F.3d 306, 313
(3d Cir. 1998)).
131 See Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2626.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 2624.
134 Id. at 2625.
135 Friedman, (Dialogic) Reply, supra note 8, at 481-82 (footnotes omitted).
136 Some clarification may be in order here. As stated previously, it is widely ac-
cepted that § 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction beyond that sanctioned by
the Supreme Court in and prior to Finley. See supra Part II.B. As discussed in this
Note, the vagueness of the statute's text concerns the scope of that expansion.
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implicitly rejects the fundamental premise of congressional superior-
ity that underlies the congressional power model.
B. Driving a Wedge in Diversity Jurisdiction
Released from the confines of congressional intent as expressed
in legislative history, the Allapattah Court is free to look at Congress's
contribution with the independence predicted by the dialogic model.
Unlike the Court's previous cases, Allapattah must be decided against
the backdrop of § 1367. As noted in Part II.B, this statute both en-
dorses much of the Court's earlier jurisprudence and authorizes an
expansion of supplementaljurisdiction. The circuit courts recognized
that such an expansion could undermine the limiting functions of the
dual requirements for diversity jurisdiction. Though it professes oth-
erwise, the Supreme Court's holding cannot be completely justified by
either the historical underpinnings of the amount-in-controversy and
complete diversity requirements or the texts of § 1367 or § 1332.
1. Historical Justifications for Amount-in-Controversy and
Complete Diversity
Jurists and legal scholars cite the fear of bias by a state against the
citizens of another state as the chief, historical justification for diver-
sity jurisdiction. 13 Chief Justice John Marshall noted "'that the con-
stitution itself either entertains the apprehensions [of bias] . . . or
views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of
suitors"' that it authorizes diversity jurisdiction.138 Judge Henry
Friendly provided numerous examples in his well-known history of di-
versity jurisdiction to support such fears of bias.139 "[A] careful read-
137 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 1454-56; Borchers, supra note 6, at 79;
Friendly, supra note 6, at 492. For additional justifications for diversity jurisdiction,
see FED. COURTS STuDY COMM., supra note 61, at 118 (summarizing Judge Richard
Posner's externality justification); id. at 419 (arguing that diversity jurisdiction also
serves to promote the visibility of the national government), To this day, scholars
debate the need for diversity jurisdiction.
138 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 1454 (quoting Bank of the U.S. v. De-
veaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809)).
139 The selection of state judges in that era raised questions of judicial indepen-
dence and reliability. "The method of appointment and the tenure of the [state]
judges were not of the sort to invite confidence .... Nor were the practical workings
of the system better than one might expect." Friendly, supra note 6, at 497. For exam-
ple, the judges of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors "I s] ometimes ... forsook
the bench and themselves pleaded before their fellow assistants. On other occasions
they appointed themselves judges of the lower courts and then reviewed their own
decisions." Id. at 497-98.
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ing of the arguments of the time," according to Judge Friendly, "shows
that the real fear was not of the state courts so much as of the state
legislatures.' 1 40 In response to political pressure, for instance, many
states enacted debtor relief laws,141 which subjected interstate lenders
in one state to the political whims of another.
42
After ratification of the Constitution, an "initial matter of busi-
ness [by Congress] was to put the federal judiciary in order.' '1 4
3
Spurred by fears of bias, Congress authorized diversity jurisdiction
and created the still extant amount-in-controversy requirement in its
first Judiciary Act.144 Some scholars view the amount-in-controversy
requirement merely as a method of artificial docket control. 45 The
Supreme Court has also held this view and, as such, developed non-
The practices employed by the state judiciaries at that time could easily lead to
manipulation of trial procedures to benefit the state's resident. See Borchers, supra
note 6, at 86. "One recurring complaint about state courts was the delay that defend-
ants (often debtors) could engineer to frustrate plaintiffs (often creditors). Federal-
ists complained about delays of twenty to thirty years in prosecuting actions in the
state courts, a staggering time period even by modern standards." Id. at 95 (footnote
omitted).
140 Friendly, supra note 6, at 495. Some state legislatures became de facto courts
of last resorts and could, therefore, alter the holdings of lower courts based on popu-
lar will. For example, the legislature of New Hampshire "vacated judgments and an-
nulled deeds alleged to have been obtained by fraud, and reversed convictions." Id.
at 498 (footnotes omitted).
141 See id. at 495. After the Revolutionary War, the nation experienced severe eco-
nomic difficulties. See Borchers, supra note 6, at 87-88.
142 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 16, at 1454-56; Borchers, supra note 6, at
87-90. This justification has lost much of its weight in modern times due to the Erie
doctrine.
143 Borchers, supra note 6, at 98.
144 Even early drafts of the Act contained such amount thresholds. See Borchers,
supra note 6, at 99-102.
The required amount in controversy has been increased several times over the
years and currently stands at $7,500. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). The initial Act con-
tained a $500 amount-in-controversy requirement. See Borchers, supra note 6, at
99-100. In 1887-88, Congress increased it to $2000. Since that time, Congress in-
creased the requirement to $3,000 in 1911, to $10,000 in 1958, and to $50,000 in
1988. See William A. Braverman, Note, Janus was not a God of Justice: Realignment of
Parties in Diversity Jurisdiction, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072, 1091 (1993).
145 See HART & WECH SLER, supra note 16, at 1473; FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., Supra
note 61, at 458-61; Rcn POSNER, THE FEDE)RAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM
92 (1996); Lloyd C. Anderson, The American Law Institute Proposal to Bring Small-Claim
State-Law Class Actions Within Federal Jurisdiction: An Affront to Federalism that Should Be
Rejected, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 325, 331 (2002).
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aggregation rules to limit the situations in which the amount-in-con-
troversy requirement could be satisfied.'
46
The amount-in-controversy requirement is more than mere
docket control however. Judge Friendly's history indicated that the
requirement was of great import to the founding generation, particu-
larly proponents of states' rights.147 A number of Founders feared the
effect of diversity jurisdiction on state courts. Patrick Henry, for ex-
ample, believed that diversity jurisdiction would ultimately lead to the
"'destruction of the state judiciaries.'"148 To limit the reach of diver-
sity jurisdiction, several states, including Federalist states, proposed
constitutional amendments to add an amount-in-controversy require-
ment for diversity jurisdiction.1
49
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reasserts in Allapattah the tradi-
tional belief that the amount-in-controversy requirement is nothing
more than a form of docket control.150 The Court, agreeing with the
textualist interpretation, holds that the statute overturns Zahn, which
required members of a diversity class action to independently satisfy
the amount-in-controversy requirement.' 51 While "flood control" is a
permissible interpretation of the mechanics by which the amount-in-
controversy requirement operates, so simple a description does not
reflect the import of this requirement-to prevent federal encroach-
ment on the traditional domain of state judiciaries.
While the Judiciary Act introduced the amount-in-controversy re-
quirement in 1789, the Court did not recognize the complete diversity
146 See Anderson, supra note 145, at 331. Under this rule, "'claims of several plain-
tiffs, if they are separate and distinct, cannot be aggregated for purposes of determin-
ing the amount in controversy."' Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d
214, 218 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3704, at 134 (1994)); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2636 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[I]n multiparty
cases, including class actions, we have unyieldingly adhered to the nonaggregation
rule stated in Troy Bank [v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911) 1.").
147 See generally Friendly, supra note 6 (summarizing history of Article III
ratification).
148 Id. at 489 (quoting 2 THE DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, AND OT1ER PROCEEDINGS, IN
CONVENTION, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 397 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., Washington 1828)).
149 See id. at 499. Massachusetts, for example, proposed a constitutional amount-
in-controversy requirement of $1,500. Id. Other states proposed substantive limits on
the ability to grant diversity jurisdiction or proposed the elimination of diversity juris-
diction altogether. Id.
150 At the outset of its opinion, the Court states the amount-in-controversy require-
ment "ensure [s] that diversity jurisdiction does not flood the federal courts with mi-
nor disputes." Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2617.
151 Id. at 2622.
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requirement until 1806. Chief Justice Marshall first articulated the
complete diversity rule in Strawbridge v. Curtiss.15 2 Although the Su-
preme Court initially rationalized Strawbridge as an interpretation of
§ 1332, Allapattah acknowledges the rule "is not mandated by the Con-
stitution, . . . or by the plain text of § 1332(a). 15 3 Instead, Allapattah
asserts its adherence "to the complete diversity rule in light of the
purpose of the diversity requirement, which is to provide a federal
forum for important disputes where state courts might favor, or be
perceived as favoring, home-state litigants.' 5 4 If citizens from the
same state are on opposing sides of a dispute, the threat of bias, ac-
cording to the Court, is dispelled, and, thus, the warrant for diversity
jurisdiction is substantially diminished.
1 55
The Court's justification is not completely satisfying. The consti-
tutional grant of diversity jurisdiction is founded on actual or poten-
tial bias in state courts and/or legislatures.1 56 Yet, the Constitution
only requires minimal diversity for federal jurisdiction. While com-
plete diversity may be based on the justification for diversity jurisdic-
tion, it does not occupy the whole field. In other words, the actual or
potential bias feared by the Founders may still occur, albeit with less
frequency, in minimal diversity cases. Much like amount-in-contro-
versy, furthermore, complete diversity has an undeniable affect on a
court's docket. Complete diversity excludes those cases that, in the
Court's opinion, are less likely to raise fears of bias. In the end, then,
complete diversity works in the same manner as amount-in-contro-
versy-"limiting the scope of diversity jurisdiction." 157 The Court
152 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). Unlike the amount-in-controversy requirement,
then, this requirement for diversity jurisdiction does not appear until seventeen years
after the Judiciary Act.
153 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2617 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
154 Id. at 2617-18. The Court has previously protected the complete-diversity re-
quirement. As Altapattah notes,
(ti he specific purpose of the complete diversity rule explains both why we
have not adopted Gibbs'expansive interpretive approach to this aspect of the juris-
dictional statute and why Gibbs does not undermine the complete diversity
rule .... Before the enactment of §1367, the Court declined in contexts
other than the pendent-claim instance to follow Gibbs' expansive approach
to interpretation of the jurisdictional statutes.
Id. at 2618 (emphasis added). But see supra note 91 (discussing the relaxation of the
complete diversity requirement for diversity class actions).
155 See Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2618.
156 See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
157 See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 61, at 566; see also Howard P. Fink,
SupplementalJurisdiction-Take It to the Limit!, 74 IND. L.J. 161, 163 (1998) (acknowl-
edging that removing the complete diversity rule would result in an inundation of
cases unless other measures were taken to reduce this influx); Rowe et at., supra note
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could have, therefore, focused on the mechanics 
of the complete di-
versity rule and interpreted the rule simply 
as a form of docket con-
trol. Unlike its holding for the amount-in-controversy 
requirement,
however, the Supreme Court directed the 
federal judiciary to apply
the complete diversity rule to the entire 
case because "[incomplete
diversity destroys original jurisdiction 
with respect to all claims."
1 58
In grappling with the effect that § 1367 
should have on the scope
of supplemental jurisdiction, Allapattah 
demonstrates the indepen-
dent analysis predicted by the dialogic 
model. As Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg asserts in her Allapattah dissent,
[e]ndeavoring to preserve the 'complete 
diversity' rule . . . the
Court's opinion drives a wedge between the 
two components of 28
U. S. C. § 1332, treating the diversity of citizenship 
requirement as
essential, the amount-in-controversy requirement 
as more readily
disposable.... It is not altogether 
clear why that should be so.
159
From a prima facie perspective, the Court, 
as Justice Ginsburg
notes, places much more importance 
on the complete diversity rule
than the statutorily-mandated, amount-in-controversy 
requirement.
Of course, neither § 1332160 nor § 1367 
contain such a hierarchy of
importance, and the justifications for 
both requirements do not ap-
pear to warrant such disparate treatment. 
Alternatively, if the Court
interpreted § 1367 in light of its traditional 
view of the two require-
ments for diversity jurisdiction, proponents 
of the congressional
power model would have difficulty reconciling 
the Court's statements
with the reasoning it employs. Congress 
may alter either the amount-
80, at 952-53 ("At an extreme, one could 
abandon [the complete diversity rule] 
en-
tirely, which effects a potentially enormous 
expansion in federal diversity jurisdiction,
threatening to swamp the federal courts 
.... ). While the Study Committee recom-
mended eliminating diversity jurisdiction, 
it favored retaining the complete diversity
rule because of its limiting function if 
Congress chose to retain diversity jurisdiction.
See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra 
note 61, at 566.
158 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2618. Under 
the Court's interpretation, a district court
should first look to see if there is complete 
diversity. If there is, it should then look 
to
see if there is at least one claim that satisfies 
the amount-in-controversy requirement.
If this second requirement is also satisfied, 
the court has original jurisdiction for those
claims and supplemental jurisdiction 
under § 1367 for all additional claims 
that do
not satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.
159 Id. at 2635 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
160 See id. ("Section 1332 itself, however, 
does not rank order the two require-
ments."). Of course, the statute cannot 
contain such a hierarchy because it fails 
to
mention the complete diversity rule. 
Given the great insistence by many 
of the
Founding generation for an amount-in-controversy 
requirement, as previously dis-
cussed, one could even argue, though 
this Note does not, that the amount-in-contro-
versy requirement should be of greater 
import than the complete diversity rule.
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in-controversy or complete diversity requirements by statute because
both are based on § 1332. According to the Allapattah Court, statutes
enacting such alterations need not speak with "extraordinary clarity in
order to modify the rules of federal jurisdiction."'16 1 However, § 1367
makes no explicit reference to either amount-in-controversy or com-
plete diversity; instead, the statute refers jointly to 'jurisdictional re-
quirements of Section 1332." Recall that Stromberg, which similarly
adopted the textualist approach, accepted the argument that § 1367
treats both requirements of diversity jurisdiction the same.
162
In treating the two elements of diversity jurisdiction so differ-
ently, the Court signals a partial disagreement with Congress over the
scope of supplemental jurisdiction. While the Court willingly accepts
the statute's text on the question of amount-in-controversy, it declines
the text's invitation to expand supplemental jurisdiction to the point
of endangering complete diversity. Despite the Court's espoused def-
erence to congressional will, then, it introduces its own view of the
proper scope of supplemental jurisdiction.
Why would the Court so willingly act to diminish one require-
ment but not the other? A possible explanation is the efficiency justi-
fication that lies at the foundation of supplemental jurisdiction.
2. Efficiency Interests Intersect Diversity Jurisdiction
Proponents of the dialogic model argue that the federal judiciary
has a "shared responsibility for evaluating the factors influencing the
use of federal courts."1 63 As Allapattah notes, "Congress had estab-
lished the Federal Courts Study Committee to take up issues relating
to 'the federal courts' congestion, delay, expense, and expansion.' 1 64
Just as Congress may consider judicial administration, the federal judi-
ciary may also look to this factor when deciding questions of lower
court jurisdiction.
The Allapattah Court implicitly considers the efficient administra-
tion of federal courts in its analysis. In addressing potential opposi-
tion to its holding, the Court argues that "the presence of a claim that
falls short of the minimum amount in controversy does nothing to
reduce the importance of the claims that do meet this require-
161 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2620.
162 Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir.
1996); see supra text accompanying note 91.
163 Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at 52. Judge Posner opines that "ju-
dicial economy is an accepted factor in judicial decision-making" when considering
questions of jurisdiction. POSNER, supra note 145, at 315.
164 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting FED. COURTS
S-UDY CoMm., supra note 61, at 3).
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ment.' 165 This statement may be viewed 
as a reference to the effi-
ciency justification used in Gibbs.
66  If the court considers an
underlying claim sufficiently important 
because it satisfies the
amount-in-controversy requirement, the 
addition of a claim not satis-
fying that requirement does nothing 
to reduce the original claim's
significance. Thus, it would be more 
efficient, according to the Court,
to authorize supplemental jurisdiction 
over those individual claims
that do not satisfy the amount-in-controversy 
requirement and allow
the entire case to proceed at one 
time.
However, a similar holding in the 
context of the complete diver-
sity requirement would have an impact 
on the overall workload of the
federal courts. As previously noted, 
Allapattah directs courts to look at
the entire case when they evaluate 
the complete diversity require-
ment.16 7 As such, federal courts will 
not be allowed to exercise sup-
plemental jurisdiction over individual, 
non-diverse plaintiffs. The
Court's rejection of a de facto minimum 
diversity standard prevents "a
potentially enormous expansion 
in federal diversity jurisdiction. 
1 6 8
Scholars have opined on the detrimental 
effect such an expansion
could have on the federal judiciary.
1 69 Judge Richard Posner, for ex-
ample, argued that the size of the 
courts' diversity docket actually
under-represents its workload because 
diversity cases are generally
considered "above-average" in difficulty.
1 70 By moving away from a
complete diversity standard, then, cases 
that might not otherwise qual-
ify for federal jurisdiction could 
be heard in federal court.
1 71
165 Id. at 2622.
166 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 
U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
167 See supra note 158 and accompanying 
text.
168 Rowe et al., supra note 80, at 953. 
Based on 1996 data, "[d]iversity jurisdic-
tion ... is invoked in slightly less than 
one-third of the civil cases filed in federal
court." Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias 
in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. U. L.Q.
119, 122 (2003). Richard Posner has 
developed a comprehensive summary 
of the
caseloads of the federal district and appellate 
courts from 1992-95. POSNER, supra
note 145, at 60-61 tbl. 3.2. Based on 
his data, diversity cases represented approxi-
mately 17.5% of the district courts' and 
8.6% of the appellate courts' caseloads. 
low-
ever, he notes that these figures may undercount 
the actual caseload figures. Id. at 58
n.6.
Beside decisions affecting federal jurisdiction, 
other factors can impact the num-
ber of cases based on diversity jurisdiction. 
See id. at 95-98, 108.
169 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 145, 
at 210 n.24.
170 Id. at 210; see also FED. CouRTs STuDY 
CoMM., supra note 61, at 429 ("[Dliversity
jurisdiction imposes a significant burden 
on federal courts to decide issues on which
they have no special expertise . . ").
171 Professor Fink argues that there will 
be efficiency gains from allowingjoinder
of more parties to a case because there 
will be fewer overall cases. Fink, supra 
note
157, at 163. While this may be true on 
some level, at some point the courts would
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Consequently, the Court may have used the statute's 
ambiguity to
promote what it perceived to be the 
efficient operation of the federal
courts while also preserving the integrity of 
the judicial system.
Accordingly, the Allapattah Court excludes 
all resources from its
analysis of the statute other than the plain 
text of § 1367 and its long-
held perceptions of the two diversity jurisdiction 
requirements. In do-
ing so, the Court implicitly acknowledges 
that its own interpretation
does not account for all of the statute's 
provision. The Court uses the
freedom gained by this exercise to examine 
§ 1367 in light of its own
considered opinion on the importance 
of the two diversity jurisdiction
requirements and the relative impact 
of each requirement on judicial
administration. As such, the Court, 
in the guise of statutory interpre-
tation, engages in a dialogue with Congress 
over the proper scope of
supplemental jurisdiction.
C. A Discretionary Counterargument
However, congressional power model 
proponents could mount a
counterargument to this view of the Court's 
reasoning. That counter-
argument would likely be based on Professor 
Shapiro's discretionary
school. Part I of this Note discussed the 
difficulty of placing Professor
Shapiro's work within either the dialogic 
or congressional power mod-
els; those concerns will be briefly set 
aside.
Professor Shapiro argued that "[dliscretionary 
decisions that go
beyond questions of timing, appropriate 
forum, and the appropriate
form of relief, and that leave an injured 
person effectively without re-
dress, can seldom if ever be consistent 
with the fulfillment of [the
judiciary'sl duty."'
72 However, "Congress has undoubted authority 
to
expand or narrow the range of permissible 
discretion, and the chal-
lenge of responsible statutory construction 
is to determine the extent
to which it has done so."
173 Section 1367(c) explicitly grants 
courts
discretion in their exercise of supplemental 
jurisdiction.1
74 Thus,
congressional power proponents could 
argue that § 1367 abrogated
both the amount-in-controversy and 
complete diversity requirements.
In order to preserve the efficient administration 
of justice, however,
the Court could simply decline to exercise 
jurisdiction over cases that
failed to satisfy the complete diversity 
requirement.
encounter diseconomies of scale-thus, 
bigger is not always better. Furthermore,
Professor Fink does not suggest 
that the efficiency gains would outweigh 
the increase
in workload.
172 Shapiro, supra note 28, at 586-87.
173 Id. at 583.
174 See supra note 87 and accompanying 
text.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
However, this counterargument still fails to take account of the
Court's independent analysis of the question presented in Allapattah.
First, § 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction beyond that previ-
ously sanctioned by the Court. 17 5 If the counterargument is correct,
the statute would not prevent the Court from declining to exercise
most, if not all, of the additional supplemental jurisdiction authorized
by Congress depending on, for example, the vagaries of the judicial
workload. A rejection of the statute's expansive view of supplemental
jurisdiction runs contrary to the congressional power model's founda-
tion of judicial deference.
Second, the Court's analysis is distinguishable from that used in
the counterargument. In Allapattah, the Court fails to hold that
§ 1367 abrogated both diversity requirements, and it failed to invoke
the provisions of subsection (c). Instead, the Court holds that the
statute makes a distinction between amount-in-controversy and com-
plete diversity. This distinction, as previously discussed, does not ap-
pear on the face of the statute. It is difficult for a congressional power
proponent to reconcile the competing propositions that Congress oc-
cupies the superior position on questions of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion and that the Supreme Court can so blatantly mischaracterize
congressional intent.
Consequently, the counterargument fails to alter this Note's con-
clusion that the Court's analysis in Allapattah is best predicted and
explained by the dialogic model.
IV. INSIGHTS INTO THE DIALOGIC MODEL AND
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
Professor Friedman developed the dialogic model to explain the
actual interaction between the federal judiciary and Congress on ques-
tions of jurisdiction. 176 The Court's reasoning in Allapattah and its
prior jurisprudence support Professor Friedman's model. The effec-
tiveness of the dialogic model to explain both pre- and post-Finley
holdings encourages a re-examination of Finley. The Court's supple-
175 Per the legislative history of the section, Congress intended § 1367 to preserve
pre-Finley holdings while at the same time overturning Finley, See H.R. REP. No. 101-
734, supra note 60, at 6874. Thus, the section permits pendent-party jurisdiction,
which the Court refused to sanction in Finley. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Servs,, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2621 (2005).
176 See supra Part I.C. Professor Friedman also developed the dialogic model, in
part, to move questions to the forefront which, he believed, had been lost in the
continual back-and-forth in the strong and mandatory congressional power debate.
See Friedman, (Dialogic) Reply, supra note 8, at 492. However, this is beyond the scope
of this Note.
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mental jurisdiction jurisprudence also helps to clarify the similarities
and distinctions, noted in Part I, between Professor Friedman's dia-
logic model and Professor Shapiro's discretionary school.
A. Finley in the Light of Allapattah
As indicated in Part II, the Court laid the modern foundation of
supplemental jurisdiction in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.1 7 7 Without
reference to jurisdictional statutes, 178 the Court justified and defined
the scope of supplemental jurisdiction and permitted lower federal
courts to employ discretion when exercising this type of jurisdic-
tion.1 7 9 Prior to Finley, therefore, the Court's myriad opinions pro-
vided evidence for the dialogic model. However, the Court's opinion
in Finley called into question this longstanding jurisprudence' 80 and
seemingly signaled the Court's support for the congressional power
model.
Allapattah undermines this interpretation of Finley. Because the
Court's pre- and post-Finley jurisprudence are better explained by the
dialogic model, Finley can be recast in light of that model as well. De-
spite its reiteration of congressional power, the Court's refusal to over-
turn Gibbs speaks volumes. The Court could, after all, have
overturned its previous precedents and merely waited for Congress to
authorize supplemental jurisdiction.
More narrowly, the question presented in Finley concerned the
scope of supplemental jurisdiction.1 8 1 In effect, the Finley Court re-
fused to permit the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over those
individuals seeking to join a suit even though they did not have an
original basis for jurisdiction. 18 2 However, the Finley Court explicitly
noted that Congress could abrogate the Court's holding if it chose to
do so. 8'3 Finley can be viewed, therefore, as an invitation for Congress
to enter a discussion on the proper scope of supplemental
jurisdiction.
177 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
179 See supra note 68 and accompanying text,
180 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
181 See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 547 (1989).
182 See id. at 556.
183 See id. Again, it should be noted that the dialogic model does not presume
conflict among the branches.
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B. The Problem of Discretion Revisited
Additionally, the Supreme Court's supplemental jurisdiction ju-
risprudence clarifies the similarities and differences between Profes-
sor Friedman's model and Professor Shapiro's school of thought. As
noted in Part I, Professor Shapiro's discretionary approach is in ten-
sion with the bimodal construct developed by Professor Friedman.
This tension can be seen both in the timing of the branches' interac-
tion and the scope of the judiciary's discretion. A reexamination of
Professor Shapiro's work in light of the analysis presented in this Note
brings greater clarity to the dialogic model and its interaction with the
discretionary school of thought.
The numerous examples cited by Professor Shapiro in his foun-
dational article, Jurisdiction and Discretion, are really indicative of two
types of discretion. The first type occurs when the judiciary exercises
its discretion in a manner consistent with the purpose of the congres-
sional act. Because jurisdictional grants tend to be over-inclusive, a
court may "fine tune" the congressional act in order to give effect to
the "central purpose of the jurisdictional grant."'1 4 Alternatively, Pro-
fessor Shapiro cites examples in which the judiciary gives little
credence to congressional intent; instead, it uses discretion to give ef-
fect to its own perspective on the matter in question,1 85 The former
type of discretion is most closely associated with Professor Shapiro's
school of thought; the latter type of discretion is synonymous with the
dialogic model proffered by Professor Friedman) 86 At its base, conse-
quently, Professor Shapiro's discretionary theory identifies an inher-
ent power vested in the federal judiciary.18 7  Professor Friedman
grounds his model in this same inherent power. In fact, Professor
Shapiro asserts that "[aill of [his] examples illustrate the productive
dialogue that can occur between the courts and the legislature when
184 Shapiro, supra note 28, at 587.
185 For example, Professor Shapiro notes that the Supreme Court has imposed
limitations on the exercise of federal question jurisdiction despite evidence "that Con-
gress intended the grant to be as broad as the Constitution allowed." Id. at 568.
Moreover, courts have exercised discretion in such a way as to make statutory restric-
tions on jurisdiction meaningless. "The broader language of the Anti-Injunction Act,
which dates back to 1793, evidences the same concern, although the Court has rather
blatantly construed the Act almost out of existence." Id. at 576 (emphasis added).
186 See, e.g., id. at 576 (discussing the Court's treatment of the Anti-Injunction
Act).
187 See id. at 586-87. Returning once again to the square-rectangle analogy, see
supra note 59, Professor Shapiro's analysis identifies additional examples of the court
acting outside of the square, or the congressional power model. As such, his analysis
lends support to the dialogic model.
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each recognizes the shared responsibility for defining the contours of
the judicial authority. Principles of separation and allocation of pow-
ers seldom involve rigid boundaries. " ' 3
An important distinction, though, between Professors Friedman
and Shapiro appears to be one of timing. Professor Shapiro's analysis
implies that Congress acts first through the adoption of a jurisdic-
tional statute. The courts, then, have an opportunity to "fine tune"
the grant through their interpretation and implementation of the stat-
ute. If Congress does not support thejudiciary's interpretation, it has
the authority to override the decision. In this way, Professor Shapiro's
analysis appears more consistent with the congressional power model.
If a court can potentially disregard Congress's intent when interpret-
ing a jurisdictional statute, however, the enactment of a statute seems
of little import. The Court's jurisprudence, as it evolved after Gibbs
and prior to the enactment of § 1367, demonstrates the judiciary's
power to shape jurisdiction pre-statutory enactment.
Was the Court's pre-Finly jurisprudence a mere aberration that
Congress corrected through the enactment of § 1367? 1' 8 Based on
the Court's analysis in Allapattah, the move from the common law-like,
pre-§ 1367 analysis to statutory interpretation has had little effect on
the Court's jurisprudence; it still approaches the question from its
own, unique perspective. To say, therefore, that § 1367 moved the
Court's jurisprudence from an unconstitutional usurpation of power
to a constitutionally permissible implementation of a jurisdictional
statute exalts form over reality.
CONCLUSION
Returning to the question presented at the beginning of this
Note, what is the relative power of the federal judiciary and Congress
to control lower federal court subject-matter jurisdiction? Much like
Hans Christian Andersen's tale, Professor Barry Friedman cautions,
"what the Court states rhetorically and what the vast body of Supreme
Court decisions indicated, are two completely different matters." 9°
Unsatisfied with the Court's beautifully crafted jurisprudence, Fried-
man, unlike the fearful courtiers, questioned the Court's rhetoric. He
developed an analytical framework-composed of two models-to re-
188 Shapiro, supra note 28, at 577 (emphasis added). For example, a court could
exercise discretion and refuse to hear a certain class of cases. Under the legislative
supremacy principle, Congress could enact another statute to limit the court's discre-
tion and, in effect, order it to hear such cases.
189 See supra text accompanying note 79.
190 Friedman, Different Dialogue, supra note 8, at 9.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
solve this fundamental question. The congressional power model
most broadly contends that Article III grants Congress the ultimate
authority to determine the subject-matter jurisdiction of lower federal
courts. Dialogic model proponents, conversely, argue that a discourse
between the coequal branches actually determines the contours of
lower federal court subject-matter jurisdiction.
The development of supplemental jurisdiction demonstrates the
flexibility and collaboration articulated by the dialogic model. The
Court's early jurisprudence authorized federal courts to exercise sup-
plemental jurisdiction and defined the contours of that jurisdiction.
Later, Finley v. United States urged Congress to enter into a dialogue
with the Court over the proper scope of supplemental jurisdiction.
Congress accepted this invitation and in fact entered into such a dia-
logue with the Supreme Court when it adopted § 1367. The Supreme
Court in Allapattah again exhibits the independence of thought pre-
dicted by the dialogic model. The Court divorced itself from congres-
sional intent as indicated in the statute's legislative history and used its
own evaluation of the relative import of the dual diversity jurisdiction
requirements to shape its interpretation of § 1367. This history sup-
ports Professor Friedman's argument that the judiciary, like Congress,
has an independent basis of power through which it can influence the
scope ofjurisdiction. In the end, it is this give-and-take between these
independent, coequal branches that determines the proper scope of
lower federal court subject-matter jurisdiction.
While this Note cannot resolve the long-running debate on the
relative power of the judiciary and Congress to shape lower federal
court subject-matter jurisdiction, it does demonstrate that the evolu-
tion of supplemental jurisdiction provides additional support for Pro-
fessor Barry Friedman's dialogic explanation of this fundamental,
constitutional question.
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